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Are temporal concepts embodied? A challenge for cognitive 
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Is time an embodied concept? People often talk and think about temporal concepts in terms 
of space. This observation, along with linguistic and experimental behavioral data documenting 
a close conceptual relation between space and time, is often interpreted as evidence that 
temporal concepts are embodied. However, there is little neural data supporting the idea that 
our temporal concepts are grounded in sensorimotor representations. This lack of evidence 
may be because it is still unclear how an embodied concept of time should be expressed in 
the brain. The present paper sets out to characterize the kinds of evidence that would support 
or challenge embodied accounts of time. Of main interest are theoretical issues concerning 
(1) whether space, as a mediating concept for time, is itself best understood as embodied 
and (2) whether embodied theories should attempt to bypass space by investigating temporal 
conceptual grounding in neural systems that instantiate time perception.
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Although the details of individual models differ, simulation 
accounts of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg and 
Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan, 2004) suggest that concepts activate the 
same perceptual and sensorimotor neural networks that represent 
actual experience with their real-world referents. Such explanations 
are intuitively plausible when accounting for the conceptualization 
of relatively concrete categories of objects and actions. For exam-
ple, according to simulation theories, comprehending the word 
punch might be expected to activate sensorimotor representations 
associated with arms more than legs, whereas processing a word 
like kick might be expected to do the opposite. Results generally 
compatible with such predictions have been found (Buccino et al., 
2005; Pulvermuller et al., 2005; Kemmerer et al., 2008) although 
questions about whether the precise details of the findings confirm 
the embodied hypothesis have been raised, and knowing how to 
best interpret the results from such studies is often unclear (Mahon 
and Caramazza, 2008; Chatterjee, 2010; Arévalo et al., 2010).
A more substantial problem for embodied theories concerns the 
representation of abstract concepts that are less obviously acces-
sible to perception or direct experience. What does it mean to make 
claims about important, or even critical underlying neuroanatomi-
cal sensorimotor structures for a concept with no obvious percep-
tual or action-based referent? Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff 
and Johnson, 1999) is often invoked to address this issue: central is 
the idea that we commonly talk, and importantly also think about 
relatively abstract domains (like time) in terms of more concrete 
domains (like space).
In order for embodied accounts of temporal conceptual rep-
resentation to be either confirmed or disconfirmed first we must 
ask: What hypotheses about the neural instantiation of tempo-
ral concepts do metaphorical and simulation models generate? 
Although directed neural hypotheses are intuitive for the embodi-
ment of concrete concepts – such as that of “apple” activating cer-
tain shapes, colors, and tastes – similar mappings onto sensory or 
IntroductIon
Time is frequently talked about in terms of space (Clark, 1973; 
Hasplemath, 1997; Evans, 2004; Tenbrink, 2007). For example, lan-
guages refer to the related temporal concepts of past, present, and 
future in spatial terms. Languages commonly conceptualize the past as 
behind, the future as in front of, and the present as here or co-locational 
with the space around the body. Behavioral data suggest that such con-
ventions in language are not arbitrary; conceptual relations between 
space and time seem to reflect a psychological reality that is more than 
“language deep.” That is, time appears to be thought about as well 
as talked about in terms of space (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Gentner 
and Boroditsky, 2001; Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Matlock et al., 
2005; Kranjec, 2006; Nunez and Sweetser, 2006; Nunez et al., 2006; 
Torralbo et al., 2006; Santiago et al., 2007; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 
2008; Kranjec et al., 2010; Kranjec and McDonough, 2011).
Along these lines, some accounts of the data make the further 
claim that the tight coupling observed between these two domains 
supports an embodied view of cognition. Embodied cognition theo-
ries vary in their details, but most evoke a simulation of the con-
cept under consideration (Wilson, 2002). They typically maintain 
that abstract concepts are given structure in the mind by the con-
straints and experiential couplings imposed by human physiology, 
as reflected in perception and action. Thus, for example, we may 
talk and think about past times as being “behind us” because, when 
we walk, what has already been experienced in time tends also to 
be located behind us in space.
Generally speaking, neuroscience research that investigates rela-
tions between temporal concepts and spatial semantics is limited 
(Kemmerer, 2005; Teuscher et al., 2008). Despite the wealth of lin-
guistic and behavioral evidence, there is surprisingly little neural 
data supporting the idea that our temporal concepts are grounded 
in space, or more generally embodied in sensorimotor or perceptual 
representations. This lack of data is partly because it is unclear what 
such supportive evidence should look like in the first place.
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or distances in space (e.g., The Friday meeting marks the end of a 
long week); temporal order judgments, or sequences, in terms of 
dynamic object relations in space (e.g., The meeting comes before 
lunch); and the past and future in egocentric spatial terms (e.g., The 
meeting is behind us). Such a division of the time concept (dura-
tion; sequential order; past/future) seems to map onto traditional 
tripartite reference frame models that distinguish between extrinsic, 
intrinsic, and deictic frames of reference and also lend themselves 
to distinct spatial schemas (Kranjec, 2006; Zinken, 2009; Kranjec 
and McDonough, 2011; see Figures 1A–C).
Why are these relations between space and time so intuitive? 
Spatial and temporal relations share many similarities by being linked 
in experience. It does generally take more time to visually scan larger 
objects; objects that arrive earlier than other objects, in time, are 
generally in front of later objects, in space; and, as ambulatory, front-
facing organisms, events in our past tend to involve locations behind 
us. To some extent, this accounts for why temporal meanings can be 
easily expressed using spatial schemas. As we discuss in detail later, 
by spatial schemas we mean pared down, analog representations of 
spatial relations that can be depicted by points, lines, and vectors 
action  experiences are not transparent for more abstract concepts. 
So before clear-cut neural hypotheses can be formed, some founda-
tional issues will need to be clarified. The present paper attempts to 
address issues related to the embodiment of temporal concepts.
We begin by reviewing the kinds of temporal concepts that tend 
to get mapped onto spatial relations. However, it is not clear to us 
that space, as relevant to the kinds of relations onto which tempo-
ral concepts are mapped, is itself embodied. A subsequent section 
therefore addresses the question of whether representations coding 
spatial concepts are best understood as embodied in the first place. 
Finally, we address the question of whether temporal concepts could 
be embodied more directly. Rather than making the claim that 
temporal concepts are embodied because they are mapped onto 
spatial concepts, one could ask if temporal concepts are embodied 
because they map onto sensory and motor representations of time 
itself. Perhaps embodied temporal concepts can bypass space. We 
briefly review temporal perception from a cognitive neuroscience 
perspective as relevant to embodied theories.
Space, tIme, Language, and thought
Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) provides a 
powerful framework for investigating the embodied representation 
of abstract concepts. At the core of conceptual metaphor theory is 
the idea that we commonly talk and think about relatively abstract 
domains (like time) in terms of more concrete domains (like space). 
Indeed, it seems as though spatial relations do provide structure for 
many abstract concepts. So, for example, we tend to conceptualize 
emotional states along a vertical axis (happy as up) and similarity 
in terms of proximity (difference as far; Meier and Robinson, 2004; 
Casasanto, 2008; Boot and Pecher, 2009). In this manner, “men-
tal metaphors” (Casasanto, 2009) presumably help us to organize 
abstract concepts by mentally mapping a concept that we cannot 
easily perceive onto a concept more directly associated with per-
ceptual or motor representations. These cross-domain mappings 
are not only argued to be conceptual in nature – i.e., more than 
mere linguistic artifacts of interest to etymologists – but they are 
argued to be asymmetrical – i.e., concrete concepts are thought to 
structure more abstract ones, but not vice versa. Experimental data 
collected using non-linguistic tasks bolster these claims. For exam-
ple, Casasanto and Boroditsky (2008) found that the remembered 
size of a line in space concordantly modulates recall for its duration, 
but not vice versa. That is, (spatially) longer lines are remembered 
as being presented for longer times, but lines of greater durations 
are not remembered as having greater spatial extent. This, and other 
related findings (Boot and Pecher, 2009), are used to support the 
claim that patterns observed in language (i.e., the systematicity and 
asymmetry of space-time mappings) reflect deeper relations that 
influence other kinds of thinking. The spatial conceptualization of 
time has, in particular, been studied by both experimentalists and 
cognitive linguists in such great detail that time is postulated to be 
“the model system of choice for linguistic and psychological tests 
of relationships between metaphorical source and target domains” 
(Casasanto, 2009).
The model status of space–time relations owes something to 
the fact that conceptual divisions within the domain of space map 
intuitively onto complementary temporal concepts. For exam-
ple, we talk about temporal extent or duration in terms of paths 
Figure 1 | Schematic depictions of three temporal concepts. 
(A) Duration; A long work week ends Friday, a short one ends Thursday, 
(B) Sequence; The meeting comes before lunch, (C) Past/Future; The 
meeting is behind us.
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and the sense in which they are used in this paper, schemas can be 
understood as representations that code for abstract spatiotem-
poral relations among objects – like paths, containment, contact, 
and support  relations – that provide a conceptual base onto which 
language can be mapped. They are not visual despite having ana-
log properties; schemas represent the relations among objects, not 
the objects. They represent a pared down product of percepts, but 
not the percepts themselves (Mandler, 2000). Schemas therefore 
are generally treated as intermediate formats in multiple system 
approaches to mental representation (see Figure 2).
It is our view that the same basic spatial relation can be encoded 
in several formats, instantiated by distinct brain regions. Such a 
view may be compatible with other multiple system approaches. 
For example, Barsalou and colleagues propose that both words and 
perceptually grounded simulations play a role in representing con-
cepts (Simmons et al., 2008); that supramodal representations of 
space and time serve an overarching role in structuring “perceptual 
symbols” (Barsalou, 1999); and that “relation simulators” serve as 
the mechanism for extracting abstract spatial and temporal relations 
from more perceptually rich imagistic representations (Barsalou, 
2003). Kemmerer and Tranel (2000) found evidence for a double dis-
sociation between linguistic and perceptual representations of spa-
tial relations. A patient with left fronto-parietal damage did poorly 
on verbal tasks relying on categorical representations with relatively 
intact performance on coordinate visuospatial tasks, while a patient 
with damage to right frontal, parietal, and temporal areas displayed 
the opposite pattern. This suggests that abstract spatial relations may 
be stored separately in verbal and non-verbal formats.
Spatial schemas are, however, presently a theoretical construct. 
Although much has been written about schemas from a philo-
sophical, developmental, and cognitive linguistic perspective, very 
little about their neural organization is understood. For present 
purposes, we can only review in more general terms how such 
abstract but discrete spatial relations, might be represented in the 
brain based on available neural data. In conducting research in this 
broader area, cognitive neuroscience has traditionally focused on 
(1) the left-hemisphere representation of spatial prepositions and 
categorical relations and (2) deficits in spatial representation associ-
ated with damage to the right-hemisphere (i.e., neglect).
For the current discussion, a short review of spatial prepositions 
and categorical relations in the context of cognitive neuroscience 
is a reasonable place to start. The spatial representation of time is 
(Mandler, 1996; Talmy, 2000). The analog spatial characteristics of 
schemas would appear to map directly onto temporal phenomena. 
However, do these experiential–semantic correlations necessarily tell 
us that temporal concepts are embodied at the neural level?
abStractIng Space
The idea that time is embodied because it is mapped onto space 
raises two fundamental questions; first, (1) how are spatial rela-
tions that are potentially important for structuring other concepts 
themselves represented in the brain and, second, (2) whether spatial 
relations represented as such are best understood as embodied. 
These two issues concern the representational continuity of spatial 
perception, thought, and language (Chatterjee, 2001, 2008). Roots 
of these ideas can be traced back to Pavio’s (1986) dual coding 
hypothesis that suggested that information can be coded in analog 
as well as symbolic formats. Here, we are concerned with their 
interactions with respect to time and space and the ramifications for 
defining the limits of what can be reasonably considered an embod-
ied abstract concept in the first place (Chatterjee, 2010). As things 
currently stand, the extent to which spatial relational information 
is in fact grounded in perceptual or sensorimotor content – i.e., 
spatial representation at the level described by embodied theories 
of cognition – is far from clear.
In conceptual metaphor theory, the idea of spatial relational 
schemas (Johnson, 1987; Mandler, 1992; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; 
Talmy, 2000) plays a critical role in embodying abstract concepts. 
Schemas are generally described as “boiled down” abstractions of 
frequently observed spatial and motion patterns. Although they 
are often portrayed as static, iconic figures, or diagrams, mental 
schemas are better understood as multi or supramodal abstractions 
of frequently occurring patterns of movement, spatial relations, 
and force dynamics. Conceptual metaphor theory makes it clear 
that schemas are not the same as percepts (“We do not see spatial 
relations the way we see physical objects”; Lakoff and Johnson, 
1999). Although their semantics often map onto the meanings of 
prepositions, they are thought to develop prior to word-like repre-
sentations (Mandler, 1992). Schemas are also distinct from the kind 
of propositional or predicate logic structures that can operate on 
spatial relations in a mental model approach (Miller and Johnson-
Laird, 1976) or the conceptual structures proposed by Jackendoff 
(1990). In many ways, schemas often seem to be defined in terms of 
what they are not, rather than what they are. Very broadly though, 
Figure 2 | The mental representation of spatial relations. The perceptual or 
imagistic representation captures the sensory-rich features of the actual scene. 
The schema abstracts the relative positions of the objects while retaining some 
analog structure. Conceptual structure is language-like, algebraic, and 
propositional. A verbal representation encodes the label referring to a discrete, 
categorical spatial relation (Adapted from Chatterjee, 2001).
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spatial relations are represented in the right supramarginal gyrus; 
where both kinds of representations may be more abstract than 
any particular sensory modality (see Figure 3).
The potential for abstract spatial relations to be instantiated in 
distinct formats of (1) amodal, left-hemisphere representations 
closely linked to language and/or (2) supramodal, right-hemi-
sphere spatial representations linked more closely to perception, 
makes investigating image schemas with respect to sensorimo-
tor grounding complicated. If representations of spatial relations 
provide organizational structure across sensorimotor modalities, 
how can one operationally distinguish between representations 
best characterized as either disembodied-and-amodal (in the 
left-hemisphere) or embodied-and-supramodal (in the right)? In 
fact, some philosophers think that making such an operational 
distinction between amodal and supramodal representations may 
be impossible (Dove, 2009; Machery, 2009). Barsalou (1999) states 
that supramodal spatial representations “constitute fundamental 
parts of perception that integrate…specific modalities (p. 638).” 
But if language itself is modeled as “part of perception” and also 
plays a role in “integrating modalities,” the model has the risk of 
becoming circular; especially if spatial language is critical for pro-
viding structure across a range of abstract concepts. For example, 
some neo-Whorfian accounts suggest that verbal category labels 
exert an influence over perception and conceptualization (Lupyan, 
2008; Regier and Kay, 2009; Lupyan et al., 2010). And it has been 
observed that patterns of spatial language exert an influence in 
both directions as well: over both time perception and abstract 
conceptualization (Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto and 
Boroditsky, 2008). Although such work establishes that links exist 
between spatial language, perception, and the conceptualization of 
other domains – links that can persist even when non-linguistic 
tasks are employed – this work tells us less about the amodal, modal, 
or supramodal nature of the participating representations underly-
ing a given behavioral effect.
While the research outlined above suggests that perceptual and 
conceptual systems are more integrated than previously thought, 
neural studies may permit researchers investigating space-time rela-
tions to make finer-grained comparisons of representations that 
serve as the basis for this integration. That is, by delineating the 
properties of potentially related, but distinct, mental representa-
tions in a multiple systems model, we can begin to ask if more 
word-like spatial labels or more percept-like image schemas ground 
temporal concepts. One step may involve determining if the neu-
ral instantiation of image schema-like spatial representations have 
more in common with the kinds of spatial relations thought to be 
instantiated in the left- or right-hemispheres. The more general 
challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to develop specific tasks and 
methods, such that, if there are discrete anatomical areas dedicated 
to processing the verbal, perceptual, or schematic representations 
of spatial relations, they can be identified. Once identified, the 
question would be: Do temporal concepts also engage the same 
neural structures?
Although empirical evidence for the existence of schematic rep-
resentation is lacking, as a thought experiment, let us imagine that 
there was good functional and anatomical evidence available for 
both (1) the neural instantiation of schematic representations and 
specifically (2) the mapping of temporal relations onto structurally 
reliant on prepositions for expressing different kinds of temporal 
concepts. When communicating information about durations (e.g., 
We examined policy across the decade), sequences (The meeting was 
before lunch), and the past or future (The illness is far behind me) 
prepositions are used to invoke different kinds of spatial relations. 
Time concepts map onto spatial prepositions (Kranjec et al., 2010) 
and spatial prepositions, practically speaking, operate as relational 
schemas. For example, the preposition on can be used to represent 
the semantic relations between a pen on a table, and a boat on a 
lake. Similarly, when prepositions like on are used in the temporal 
domain as with, The meeting is on Wednesday, what is being invoked 
is a relational schema, emphasizing collocation, and contact.
Frederici (1981) demonstrated that aphasics with left posterior 
temporal–parietal lesions show semantic impairments that dis-
sociate from syntactic ones in processing locative prepositions. 
Subsequently, Landau and Jackendoff (1993) proposed that the 
parietal cortex might process prepositions because it serves as the 
terminus of the dorsal “where” pathway. Damasio and colleagues 
(Damasio et al., 2001; Emmorey et al., 2002) corroborated this idea 
by finding a role for the left supramarginal gyrus and inferior frontal 
gyrus in the comprehension of locative prepositions. Noordzij et al. 
(2008) found that understanding the meanings of locative preposi-
tions embedded in sentences, and the spatial relations expressed 
in picture formats were both associated with activation in the left 
supramarginal gyrus. And Wu et al. (2007) found that damage to the 
left inferior frontal–parietal cortices impaired knowledge of locative 
relations lexicalized by prepositions in simple sentences. In studies 
investigating categorical spatial relations using non-verbal tasks, 
additional work from our own laboratory and others also implicate 
left-hemisphere areas in the representation of the type of categorical 
spatial relations encoded by locative prepositions. Specifically, these 
studies find the inferior parietal lobe and frontal operculum to be 
involved (Kosslyn, 1987; Kosslyn et al., 1989, 1998; Amorapanth 
et al., 2010). The general view that emerges from both literatures – on 
spatial prepositions and on categorical spatial relations – suggests 
that the left-hemisphere, more than the right, processes these kinds 
of relations across verbal and non-verbal tasks. Furthermore, the 
inferior parietal cortex and possibly parts of dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex involving inferior and posterior middle frontal gyri are critical 
in mediating this kind of spatial relational knowledge.
However, despite this left-hemisphere bias for processing prepo-
sitions and categorical spatial relations, spatial representation and 
spatial attention are more generally regarded as right-lateralized 
functions of the inferior parietal cortex, and the supramarginal 
gyrus in particular (McFie et al., 1950; Vallar and Perani, 1986). 
In contrast to left-hemisphere word-like representations, right-
hemisphere spatial representations are often described as being 
analog in format (Bisiach, 1993). Furthermore, representations 
of space in the right parietal lobe are thought to be supramodal, 
as there is evidence spatial deficits associated with neglect affect 
sensory modalities other than vision (Farah et al., 1989) and that 
right-hemisphere spatial representations are dissociable from 
visual imagery (Farah et al., 1988). Thus, spatial representation in 
the right-hemisphere can also be conceived as separable from any 
particular sensory modality. The picture that emerges from the 
cognitive neuroscience literature is one in which word-like spatial 
relations are represented in the left supramarginal gyrus and analog 
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structures outside (but perhaps adjacent to) those sensorimotor 
areas thought to represent the most concrete aspects of direct 
sensory experience might be doing the most important work in 
representing abstract spatial relations. Using similar logic, stroke 
patients with lesions directly in perceptual or sensorimotor areas 
might be expected to retain the ability to represent the relations 
contained within perceptual arrays because those areas involved 
in fully representing the rich, perceptual features of visual displays 
may not be necessary for extracting the abstract relations between 
objects (in adult brains at least).
Considered from such a perspective, the role of schemas in a 
continuous, graded model of conceptual representation could actu-
ally be useful for marking where in this system embodiment trails 
off and abstraction begins. Before we can conclude one way or the 
other, many more details pertaining to how (and if) schematic 
relations are represented in the brain need to be known. Although 
empirical data relating to schematic representation is in short sup-
ply, we entertain the theoretical position that abstract, schema-
like representations mediate between perception and language but 
that these representations are not embodied in the strict sense; i.e., 
there are no convincing reasons to think that schemas necessarily 
involve simulating previous experience with instances of a concept. 
According to our view, if schemas are instantiated in the brain they 
will be found to code the same kind of abstract structural roles 
concordant spatial schemas. The question would still remain: are 
schemas themselves best understood as embodied? In conceptual 
metaphor theory, schemas play a critical role in structuring more 
abstract concepts (like emotions, similarity, and time). However, 
since the idea of a schema remains a theoretical construct, it is par-
ticularly important to consider what finding schemas instantiated 
in the brain would actually tell us about embodiment.
Not much about schematic representation is agreed upon, but 
schemas, by most definitions, involve a process of moving away 
from the concrete perceptual attributes of objects in order to 
represent the more abstract relations between them. Thus, there 
are good reasons to hypothesize that representations resulting 
from such a process would in fact not involve perceptual or sen-
sorimotor neural networks, or if they did, they would be greatly 
attenuated. In fact, the main proponents of embodied theories 
of mind acknowledge this limit. Lakoff (1987) writes that “image 
schemas are kinesthetic in nature, that is, they have to do with 
the sense of spatial locations, movement, shape, etc., independent 
of any particular sensory modality.” (See Hampe, 2005 for more 
recent discussions, especially chapters by Dean and Grady). And 
Barsalou (2003) describes how abstract representations of spatial 
relations filter out the irrelevant details of rich simulations. Thus, 
even according to conceptual metaphor and simulation theories, 
when devising neural studies for tasks designed to invoke schemas, 
Figure 3 | (A) Transverse and (B) sagittal slices selected to illustrate anatomical 
areas discussed in Sections “Abstracting Space” and “Simulating Time” 
hypothesized to be important for locative and categorical spatial information 
(in red), supramodal spatial representation and attention (in yellow), and timing 
(in blue): Colored squares highlight areas including: (1) left inferior frontal gyrus, 
(2) left supramarginal gyrus, (3) right supramarginal gyrus, (4) right inferior frontal 
gyrus, (5) supplementary motor area, (6) basal ganglia (location of caudate 
shown here), and (7) cerebellum.
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its own terms; both grammatically and semantically. The focus 
on spatial metaphoric accounts of abstract conceptualization by 
embodied theories has had the ironic consequence of creating a 
blind spot for temporal language. By most accounts, the use of 
“purely” temporal, time-specific language precedes the use of meta-
phoric, spatial–temporal language in development (Nelson, 1996). 
Simulation approaches might closely examine how the brain codes 
obligatory grammatical categories like (viewer-centered) tense and 
(event-related) aspect, examining the ways in which such gram-
maticalization patterns could relate back to non-linguistic processes 
associated with the representation of distinct temporal reference 
frames. Similarly, the lexicalization of pure temporal concepts asso-
ciated with particular temporal perspectives (e.g., egocentric: now, 
yesterday; duration: while, yet; sequence: later; frequency: always, 
never) also occurs sooner in development compared to spatial 
metaphoric language for time. Although little is known about the 
development of embodied concepts, the early acquisition of time-
pure lexical concepts and grammatical rule use implies, at least, that 
spatial grounding is not necessary for all temporal conceptualiza-
tion. If space is not necessary for grounding temporal concepts, it 
suggests that support for simulation accounts might be found by 
looking for semantic grounding in sensorimotor networks associ-
ated with temporal, not spatial, processing.
The major claims made by simulation accounts of embodied 
cognition center around the basic idea that representing a particu-
lar concept at least partially entails the same sensorimotor neu-
ral networks activated during direct experience with the thing to 
which the concept refers. Recall that a general approach like this 
makes straightforward predictions. For example, representing con-
cepts associated with actions (e.g., kick) should involve networks 
in primary motor cortex or visual motion areas, while represent-
ing concepts associated with sounds (e.g., thunder) should involve 
networks in primary auditory cortex. Predictions can be made with 
finer granularity within a domain such that an embodied hypothesis 
might predict that comprehending the meaning of punch would acti-
vate homuncular motor representations associated with arms more 
than legs, and kick, legs more than arms. If simulation accounts view 
concrete concepts as co-activating distributed networks of sensorim-
otor and domain-specific linguistic representations, how would one 
expect such a perspective to be applied to time? Although research on 
conceptual metaphor suggests that we look for the neural ground-
ing of temporal concepts in representations of spatial schemas, as 
discussed above, neural structures supporting spatial schemas might 
not be sufficient to support simulation theories. Fortunately, the 
domain of time may permit a relatively direct approach for testing 
hypotheses about the embodiment of temporal concepts.
The brain has distinct neural mechanisms for representing 
different timescales and types of temporal information. Roughly, 
sub-second intervals are processed by subcortical areas, supra-sec-
ond intervals by more diffuse cortical circuits, and the clock that 
underlies large-scale circadian rhythms is located in the suprachi-
asmatic nucleus of the hypothalamus (Buhusi and Meck, 2005). 
Recent meta-analyses further corroborate this view indicating that 
sub-cortical networks including the cerebellum and basal ganglia 
are strongly associated with processing the motor and perceptual 
components of sub-second timing tasks, while cortical areas like the 
supplementary motor area (SMA) and prefrontal cortex are more 
among objects in space (and time) that are evoked by prepositions, 
but in a format and with a neural implementation that is distinct 
from both perceptual and verbal representations.
Conceived as such, schemas are disembodied at least as much as 
they are embodied. According to such a view one can, in principle, 
hold that schemas may be (a) derived from perceptual and motor 
experiences, (b) have some analog, and (c) some computational 
properties of abstract representations (as Barsalou, 1999 claims) and 
still maintain that such features are as characteristic of a “disem-
bodied” representation as much as they are an “embodied” one. The 
notion that an abstract, analog representation need not be embodied 
in the strict simulation sense is the fulcrum of this position. It is 
an important point to consider because when one makes strong 
claims about the embodiment of image schemas one necessarily 
underplays the role of higher-order processes like relational thought, 
abstraction, and analogy that may play an especially important role 
during early cognitive development (Mandler, 2000; Gentner, 2003) 
and continue to mediate relations between spatial concepts and the 
more abstract concepts that find structure in space. Although not 
opposed to embodied cognition accounts, the view put forth here 
is compatible with a graded account of mental representation that 
resists making strong claims about the necessity of sensorimotor 
simulation in grounding language and thought (Chatterjee, 2010). 
It is also consistent with Talmy’s (2000) view and Mandler’s (2004) 
developmental framework which suggest that image schemas pro-
vide the foundation for explicitly accessible concepts. It is our posi-
tion that conceptual meanings must be grounded on representations 
with content accessible to conscious analysis, thus it is unclear how 
sensorimotor representations impenetrable to conscious analysis 
could serve this purpose1. Schemas conceived in such a manner 
resemble the kind of meaningful but not perceptual right-hemisphere 
spatial representations described by early researchers of neglect:
Spatial analogs may be claimed to be unfit to convey the full meaning 
a representation is supposed to be endowed with. In the absence of 
further comparative analysis of what is meant by “meaning” and 
“representation”, my reply is that, on the one hand, meaning may 
be inherent in the kinetic features of spatial analogs (Bisiach and 
Berti, 1990), and, on the other, analogue representation may be 
conceived as being “enthymematic”– that is, leaving unexpressed 
a great deal of the antecedents and entailments of which meaning 
consists (Bisiach, 1992). Unlike pictures, as Sterelny (1990) would 
say, analogue representations are “preinterpreted” (Bisiach, 1993).
This view is consistent with the developmental mechanism that 
Mandler (2000) terms perceptual analysis and defines as “a process 
in which perceptual input is attentively analyzed and recoded into 
a new format.” For schemas to be independently meaningful, they 
must come “preinterpreted.”
SImuLatIng tIme
But does an embodied temporal concept necessarily need a spatial 
schema for grounding? Consider the fact that we do not only talk 
about time in terms of space. We frequently talk about time in 
1See Kranjec and McDonough (2011) for a thorough theoretical account for why 
image schema content should be expected to be explicit and therefore represented 
outside sensorimotor areas. We also report experimental evidence in support of 
this idea.
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involved in  supra-second  timing (Wiener et al., 2010). However, a 
related lesion study suggests that the basal ganglia are not critical 
for timing per se, but rather with the production of timed move-
ments (Coslett et al., 2010). Other recent work from our laboratory 
using fMRI and a duration discrimination task, also implicates the 
SMA in supra-second timing, in addition to left inferior frontal, and 
superior temporal cortical structures (Wencil et al., 2010). However, 
the perception of time is not simply a matter of representing dura-
tion. The neural instantiation of duration information dissociates 
with that for sequence information. There is evidence that mak-
ing ordinal sequence judgments involves distinct premotor cortical 
areas as compared to making duration judgments (Schubotz and von 
Cramon, 2001) and that learning the sequence of a motor response 
involves right parietal structures while learning the duration of the 
same response, the cerebellum (Sakai et al., 2002). And although less 
accurately described as perceptual in nature, the neural architecture 
underlying thinking about the future and the past has also been 
investigated (Hassabis et al., 2007; Abraham et al., 2008; Arzy et al., 
2009a,b). Other work finds the parietal cortex to be important for 
representing time in a more abstract sense of magnitude (Bueti and 
Walsh, 2009). Unlike other very abstract concepts (like hope for exam-
ple), something is already known about the neural bases for several 
distinct cognitive processes associated with temporal cognition.
Considering what we know about timing in the brain, it seems 
that simulation approaches would benefit from using tasks and 
methods designed to probe within the domain of time to look for 
specific relations between neural areas specialized for a particular 
kind of time-specific cognitive processing (e.g., duration, sequence, 
or past/future representation) and an associated linguistic represen-
tation (e.g., distinctions between lexicalized concepts or grammati-
cal class). If a simulation account of temporal conceptualization 
does not predict the grounding of time concepts in neural areas 
dedicated to processing temporal information it should explicitly 
state why this should be the case.
concLuSIonS
Time is the most frequently used noun in the English language 
(Soanes and Stevenson, 2007). But where do we look for temporal 
concepts in the brain? Current cognitive science approaches tend 
to investigate the spatial organization of temporal concepts and 
draw conclusions about embodied cognition. Although linguistic 
and experimental behavioral data are abundant, little neural data 
is available. This is not an ideal state for the field because provid-
ing direct evidence for the embodiment of abstract concepts is 
potentially possible within cognitive neuroscience (e.g., What are 
the neural bases for spatial schemas? For time perception? To what 
extent do time concepts map onto such structures?).
A study by Kemmerer (2005) is notable. In one of the few neuro-
scientific studies investigating the relations between space, time, and 
semantics, Kemmerer found evidence for a double dissociation for 
impaired comprehension of either the spatial or temporal meanings 
of prepositions in patients with focal brain lesions. The left supramar-
ginal gyrus was determined to be a critical structure for representing 
the spatial meaning of prepositions, whereas areas important for rep-
resenting temporal meanings were less clearly defined. However, the 
left perisylvian cortex was implicated. The results at least suggest that 
the spatial and temporal meanings of prepositions are represented 
separately, but are equivocal with respect to the current discussion. 
However, they suggest that the language of time is stored separately 
from the language of space. In general, embodied accounts would 
benefit by probing further for domain-specific dissociations between 
representations of temporal and spatial concepts in areas associated 
with spatial and temporal perception using cognitive neuroscience 
methods. Lesion studies, especially larger group studies, are particu-
larly well suited for testing hypotheses about embodied cognition. 
They allow for making strong inferences regarding the necessity of 
a particular anatomical structure (e.g., perceptual or sensorimotor 
structures) for performing a given cognitive function. Well-designed 
lesion studies could provide especially valuable information concern-
ing both (1) the roles that perceptual or schematic formats play in 
representing spatial relational information and (2) the part that such 
spatial representations vs. separate structures dedicated to temporal 
perception play in grounding our concepts of time (see Figure 3). 
Clearly, tasks that compare neural representations across verbal and 
perceptual tasks are required.
The ways in which we have described the conceptual grounding 
of time in either spatial abstractions or more directly in sensori-
motor processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive. By prob-
ing domain-specific sensorimotor areas associated with temporal 
perception and perspective, cognitive neuroscientists place them-
selves in a position to potentially confirm aspects of simulation 
accounts while bypassing conceptual metaphor theories reliant on 
spatial schematic grounding. Alternatively, if temporal concepts find 
structure primarily in spatial abstractions, time could become the 
model domain for demonstrating how a particular abstract concept 
can become disembodied, or disconnected from the neural basis of 
its concrete representation rather than the other way around. The 
notion that conceptual processing involves both verbal and non-
verbal representations is not new (Pavio, 1986) and has been refined 
in the context of more recent debates concerning embodiment and 
simulation theories (Louwerse, 2010; Riordan and Jones, 2010). In 
the case of space, distinguishing between formats presents a par-
ticular challenge, as it may be that the same basic spatial meanings 
encoded by amodal left-hemisphere verbal representations are also 
inherent to supramodal right-hemisphere representations.
Answers to questions related to these issues will depend partly 
on the neural evidence as it becomes available, but also on how 
theoretical discussions concerning the nature of spatial abstraction 
and conceptual scaffolding unfold. The present paper has tried to 
frame core issues concerning the embodied structure of abstract 
concepts with respect to some of what is currently known about the 
functional neuroanatomy of spatial and temporal representations. 
The depiction of embodied theories presented here may strike some 
as superficial. However, we are hopeful that the way common issues 
have been broadly framed will make addressing them more amena-
ble to direct hypothesis testing using empirical methods. If timing 
areas play no role in grounding time concepts, those taking a strong 
embodied approach should be able to provide a rigorous expla-
nation for why this is the case. If spatial representations ground 
time concepts, a more fine-grained neuroanatomical account 
capable of distinguishing between word-like  representations in the 
 left-hemisphere and more perceptual ones in the right-hemisphere 
may be possible. And finally, if the kinds of spatial schemas that are 
thought to ground temporal concepts  cannot be easily identified, 
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described, or contrasted with other kinds of spatial representations 
(i.e., symbolic or perceptual), then the validity of this proposed 
intermediate representational construct may need to be reconsid-
ered by those taking an empirical approach.
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